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To	Remake	Man	and	the	World…comme	si?	
Camus’s	“Ethics”	contra	Nihilism			 Norman	K.	Swazo1		
ABSTRACT		Whether	Albert	Camus’s	“existentialist”	thought	expresses	an	“ethics”	is	a	subject	of	disagreement	among	commentators.		Yet,	there	can	be	no	reading	of	Camus’s	philosophical	and	literary	works	without	recognizing	that	he	was	engaged	in	the	post-WW2	period	with	two	basic	questions:	How	must	we	think?	What	must	we	do?		If	his	thought	presents	us	with	an	ethics,	even	if	not	systematic,	it	seems	to	be	present	in	his	ideas	of	“remaking”	both	man	and	world	that	are	central	to	his	
The	 Myth	 of	 Sisyphus	 and	 The	 Rebel.	 	 Curiously,	 however,	 this	 apparent	recommendation	is	ambiguous	for	the	fact	that	while	Camus	proposes	as	much	he	does	 so	 “comme	si,”	 i.e.,	 form	a	perspective	 of	 “as	 if.”	 	 A	 clarification	of	 this	qualification	 is	 presented	 here	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Camus	 rejects	 any	nihilist	 project	 that	 countenances	 either	 suicide	 or	murder.	 	 Thereby	 one	may	argue	that	Camus	indeed	has	an	ethics	that	remains	pertinent	to	today.			 Keywords:	Camus;	philosophical	suicide;	nihilism;	ethics			Camus’s	Two	Basic	Questions		Nietzsche’s	 late	19th	century	anti-metaphysics	 informs	the	philosophy	of	Albert	Camus,	 especially	 because	 Camus’s	 philosophical	 impetus	 was	 to	 counter	nihilism	 and	 its	 perceived	 onset	 politically	 in	 the	 fascism	of	 twentieth	 century	Europe.		For	Camus,	appeals	to	the	authority	of	transcendent	values—i.e.,	belief	in	 the	 God	 of	 Abrahamic	 religion,	 belief	 in	 the	 classical	 ideas	 of	 the	 Good,	 the	True,	and	the	Beautiful—have	lost	what	was	believed	to	be	an	“indubitable”	and	“unshakeable”	foundation.	We	are	suspended	(as	it	were)	over	an	abyss,	having	lost	 our	 false	 innocence,	 and	 this	 without	 “lamentation”	 or	 “glorification.”2	Accepting	 these	 assumptions,	 then,	Camus	 takes	 center	 stage	 in	 a	 21st	 century	interrogation	having	two	questions:	How	must	we	think?	What	must	we	do?		These	 questions	 translate	 to	 Camus’s	 philosophically	 fundamental	question	 of	 suicide.	 	 Whether	 we	 live	 or	 die,	 those	 questions	 presuppose	 a	
practical	 rationality.	 	 If	 “what	 is	 called	 a	 reason	 for	 living	 is	 also	 an	 excellent	reason	for	dying,”	and	vice	versa,	then	one	may	ask	whether	Camus	presents	us	with	an	“ethics”	that	issues	from	his	encounter	with	the	absurd.	Of	course,	Camus	expresses	his	perception	of	his	time,	believing	as	he	did	after	the	Second	World	War	 that	 “we	 have	 to	 hasten	 to	 create	 in	 the	 interval	 between	 [the	 “frenzied																																																									1	Professor	of	Philosophy,	Department	of	History	and	Philosophy,	North	South	University,	Dhaka	Bangladesh;	norman.swazo@northsouth.edu	2	Albert	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	ed.	P.	Thody,	trans.	E.C.	Kennedy	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1970),	p.	245.	 	Camus,	writing	 in	February	1947,	uses	 these	words	 in	reference	 to	 Jules	Roy’s	La	Vallée	Heureuse.	
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embraces”	 of]	 war	 and	 revolution,” 3 	i.e.,	 after	 a	 war	 that	 promised	 total	destruction.		Critics	have	written	little	on	this	aspect	of	Camus’s	thought		Lana	Starkey	comments	that	Camus	is	neglected	as	a	moral	philosopher.4		Herbert	 Hochberg,	 however,	 remains	 notably	 severe	 in	 his	 assessment. 5		Hochberg	 argued	 that	 Camus	 sought,	 but	 failed,	 to	 derive	 an	 ethics	 from	 the	absurdity	 of	 the	 human	 condition.	 Situating	 Camus	 among	 empiricists	 in	epistemological	outlook,	Hochberg	 interprets	Camus	as	accepting	 the	 factuality	of	his	existence	and	of	the	world	as	disclosed	in	ordinary	experience.		Our	task	is	to	live	in	the	world	as	we	find	it.		Camus	thus	counters	the	nihilist	“who	does	not	believe	in	what	exists.”	For	Camus,	however,	Hochberg	comments,	“man	cannot	grasp	 rationally	 an	 explanation	 of	 his	 and	 the	 world’s	 existence,”	 hence	 the	absurdity	of	the	human	condition.	This	condition	is	expressed	in	the	“polarity”	of	the	 human	 desire	 to	 know	 and	 the	world’s	 silence	 about	 the	 foundations	 and	promises	of	human	existence.	 	 In	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus	and	 in	The	Rebel,	Camus	refuses	the	nihilist	option:	“The	final	conclusion	of	absurdist	reasoning	is,	in	fact,	the	 repudiation	 of	 suicide	 and	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 desperate	 encounter	between	human	inquiry	and	the	silence	of	the	universe.”6		Hochberg	complains,			Camus	has	leaped	from	the	factual	premise	that	the	juxtaposition	of	man	and	 the	 universe	 is	 absurd,	 to	 the	 evaluative	 conclusion	 that	 this	 state	ought	 to	 be	 preserved…For	 this	 transition	 we	 have	 no	 justification.		Without	 such	 justification,	 Camus	 has	 not,	 in	 the	 least	 way,	 made	 his	point.	 	 To	 produce	 such	 a	 justification	 would	 obviously	 involve	 the	construction	of	an	ethic.		But	it	is	precisely	on	this	point	that	Camus	builds	his	ethical	view.		Hence	all	that	follows	leans	on	a	hollow	argument.7			Hochberg	requires	a	 logic	of	 “justification.”	But,	 there	 is	ample	reason	to	argue	that	Hochberg	misses	Camus’s	point.		 Does	 Camus’s	 refusal	 render	 his	 “ethics”	 hollow	 and	 inadequate?	 I	propose	 Camus’s	 questions	 remain	 central	 to	 a	 postmodern	 ethics	 such	 as	 he	anticipated	 would	 have	 to	 be	 thought	 differently	 from	 the	 philosophy	 of	Nietzsche,	 Marx,	 and	 Kierkegaard	 and	 differently	 from	 existentialists	 such	 as	Jaspers	 and	 Sartre.	 	 If,	 upon	 confronting	 the	 absurd,	 the	 act	 of	 suicide	 is	 not	 a	legitimate	choice	while	not	believing	in	God	or	in	the	authority	of	transcendent																																																									3Ibid.,	243.	4	Those	writing	on	Camus’s	ethics	are	few.	 	See,	e.g.,	Michael	Mohrt	and	Warren	Ramsey,	“Ethic	and	 Poetry	 in	 the	Work	 of	 Camus,”	Yale	French	Studies	 1	 (1948):	 113-118;	 Serge	Doubrovsky,	“The	 Ethics	 of	 Albert	 Camus,”	 in	 Camus:	 A	 Collection	 of	 Critical	 Essays,	 ed.	 Germaine	 Brée,	(Englewood	Cliffs,	NJ:	Prentice-Hall,	1962),	71-84;	Harold	A.	Durfee,	“Albert	Camus	and	the	Ethics	of	 Rebellion,”	 Foundational	 Reflections:	 American	 University	 Publications	 in	 Philosophy,	 29,	(Dordrecht:	 Martinus	 Nijhoff,	 1987),	 147-177;	 Lana	 Starkey,	 “Albert	 Camus	 and	 the	 Ethics	 of	Moderation,”	 Parrhesia	 21	 (2014):	 144-160.	 	 Starkey’s	 use	 of	 ‘virtue	 ethics’	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	Camus	seeks	to	warrant	an	Aristotelian	eudaimonistic	ethics,	since,	as	Starkey	(p.	7)	opines,	for	Camus	 “virtues	 are	 unintelligible	 in	modernity.”	 	 She	 does,	 however,	want	 to	 identify	 Camus’s	notion	 of	 la	 mesure	 as	 equivalent	 in	 meaning	 to	 the	 Aristotelian	 virtue	 of	 temperance	 or	moderation	(sophrosuné).	5	Herbert	Hochberg,	“Albert	Camus	and	the	Ethic	of	Absurdity,”	Ethics	75(2),	(1965):	87-102.	6	Albert	Camus,	The	Rebel,	trans.	Anthony	Brower	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1956),	6.	7	Hochberg,	92.	
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values,	 then	we	have	some	thinking	 to	do.	We	have	 to	perform	our	deeds	with	reference	 to	 a	 thinking	 that	 finds	 “the	 means	 to	 proceed	 beyond	 nihilism.”8		Camus	discloses	 to	us	 “reasons	 for	 living	and	 for	 creating”	beyond	 the	 “mortal	problems”	he	has	engaged	by	way	of	illustration	(deliberately	not	to	say	here,	by	
way	of	justification).		Camus	does	not	propose	we	live	haphazardly	or	in	aimless	wandering	about,	but	(echoing	Nietzsche)	instead	to	live	as	creators.		Camus	desires	 that	we	proceed	 beyond	nihilism,	 appropriating	 Pindar’s	counsel—to	aspire	not	 to	 immortal	 life	but,	 rather,	 to	exhaust	 the	 limits	of	 the	possible.9		 Acknowledging	 human	 mortality,	 we	 require	 a	 sense	 of	 what	 is	possible.	 Despite	 the	 absurdity	 of	 the	 human	 condition,	 our	mortal	 life	 is	 still	worth	living.	Hence,	our	specifically	human	task	is	to	work	to	exhaust	the	limits	of	the	possible	through	creative	acts.		The	question,	then,	is:		How	far	shall	we	go	in	 exhausting	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 possible?	 	 This	 question	 is	 entirely	 salient	 in	postmodern	 context.	 	 Camus	 reminded	 that	 Nazism	 was	 a	 movement	 born	 of	rebellion,	but	it	had	an	impetus	toward	irrationality.		Nazis	were	free	to	act	with	irrational	 terror,	 and	 thus	with	 impunity.	 	 Theirs	was	 a	movement	 of	 “nihilist	revolution,”	 establishing	 “a	 mystique	 beyond	 the	 bounds	 of	 any	 ethical	considerations,”	 its	 consequences	 of	 suicide	 and	 murder	 thereby	 “neither	efficacious	nor	exemplary.”10		Camus	 writes,	 “Those	 who	 rush	 blindly	 to	 history	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	irrational,	proclaiming	that	it	is	meaningless,	encounter	servitude	and	terror	and	finally	emerge	into	the	universe	of	concentration	camps.”11		Mussolini’s	fascism,	Hitler’s	 Nazism,	 Russian	 Communism	 betrayed	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 revolution,	politically	cynical	in	their	drawing	from	“moral	nihilism.”		They	offered	“private	and	 public	 techniques	 of	 annihilation,”	 suicide	 and	 murder:	 “If	 men	 kill	 one	another,	 it	 is	 because	 they	 reject	mortality	 and	desire	 immortality	 for	 all	men.		Therefore,	in	one	sense,	they	commit	suicide.”12		These	revolutionaries	went	too	far	 in	 their	 turn	 to	 history.	 	 Camus	 would	 have	 us	 be	 rebels	 “at	 grips	 with	history,”	 but	 moving	 beyond	 moral	 nihilism:	 “instead	 of	 killing	 and	 dying	 in	order	to	produce	the	being	that	we	are	not,	we	have	to	live	and	let	live	in	order	to	create	what	we	 are.’13		 Contrary	 to	moral	 nihilism’s	 refrain	 that	 “everything	 is	permitted,”	Camus	prefers	Van	Gogh’s	“admirable	complaint”—“I	can	very	well,	in	 life	 and	 in	painting,	 too,	 do	without	God.	 	But	 I	 cannot,	 suffering	 as	 I	 do,	 do	without	 something	 that	 is	 greater	 than	 I	 am,	 that	 is	 my	 life—the	 power	 to	create.”14		In	The	Myth	of	 Sisyphus,	Camus	 opined,	 “There	 is	 but	 one	 useful	 action,	that	of	remaking	man	and	the	earth.”15		We	can	take	the	statement	as	comprised	of	two	interdependent	assertions:	(1)	It	is	useful	to	remake	humankind;	(2)	It	is																																																									8	Albert	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus	and	Other	Essays,	 trans.	 Justin	O’Brien	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1955),	“Preface.”	9	Camus	cites	Pindar,	Pythian,	iii.	10	Camus,	The	Rebel,	184.	11	Ibid.,	246.	12	Ibid.,	247.	13	Ibid.,	252.	14	Ibid.,	257.	15	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	64.	
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useful	 to	 remake	 the	 earth.	 For	 Camus,	 then,	 there	 is	 some	utility	 to	 remaking	humankind	 and	 the	 earth.	 	 ‘Remaking’	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 with	 reference	 to	destiny:	“It	is	not	sufficient	to	live,	there	must	be	a	destiny	that	does	not	have	to	wait	for	death,”	he	says.		“It	is	therefore	justifiable	to	say	that	man	has	an	idea	of	a	better	world	than	this.”16		The	task	is	to	make	one’s	 life	a	work	of	art,	thus	to	complete	what	reality	 lacks,	as	 lucidity	 informs	us	 that,	 “suffering	has	no	more	meaning	than	happiness.”17		With	this	observation,	Camus	offers	a	tragic	sense	of	life:	 life	 “can	 be	magnificent	 and	 overwhelming—that	 is	 the	 whole	 tragedy.”18		But	 this	 recognition	 of	 the	 tragedy	 of	 human	 life	 elicits	 the	 essential	comportment:	 “The	 realization	 that	 life	 is	 absurd	 cannot	be	 an	 end,	 but	 only	 a	beginning.”19		When	 Camus	 says	 ‘earth’	 we	 are	 to	 interpret	 him	 to	 mean	 ‘world’,	 the	latter	understood	to	be	the	locus	of	meaning	and	understanding	in	relation	to	our	
disclosure	of	meaning	 (what,	 as	Heidegger	put	 it,	 is	 ‘world’	 in	 the	 sense	of	 “the	referential	 context	 of	 signification,”	 Bedeutsamkeit20).	 	 Yet,	 in	 the	 moment	 of	stating	as	much,	Camus	also	demurs—“I	shall	never	remake	man.		But	one	must	do	 ‘as	 if.’”	 	 ‘…as	 if…’,	 he	 says.21		 The	 statement	 is	 enigmatic.	 In	 the	 French,	 one	says	‘…comme	si…’.		It	seems	this	statement	speaks	to	two	actions	Camus	will	not	himself	undertake.	 	We	must	clarify	 the	 interpretive	problem	presented	 in	 this	assertion.		There	are	multiple	implicatures	present	in	the	statement:		
• Implicature	1:	‘I	shall	never	remake	man.’	(reference	to	self)	
• Implicature	 2:	 ‘I	 shall	 never	 remake	 man.’	 (reference	 to	 an	
imperative)	
• Implicature	3:	‘I	shall	never	remake	man.’	(reference	to	time	frame)	
• Implicature	4:	‘I	shall	never	remake	man.’	(reference	to	action)	
• Implicature	 5:	 ‘I	 shall	 never	 remake	man.’	 (reference	 to	 object	 of	
action)		The	questions	following	from	these	implicatures	are	obvious.	Are	we	to	accent	‘I’,	to	 say	 ‘Camus	 means	 he	 himself	 will	 not	 do	 so’,	 but	 that	 he	 leaves	 it	 open	 to	
others,	to	us,	to	do	so?		Or,	are	we	to	accent	‘shall’,	Camus	meaning	that	he	gives	to	
himself	 an	 imperative	 not	 to	 do	 so,	 even	 though	 he	 might	 have	 an	 inclination	(whether	of	emotion	or	appetite)	to	remake	humankind	and	the	world?		Etc.,	etc.,	the	 questions	 follow	 each	 implicature.	 	 Howsoever	 we	 interpret	 Camus’s																																																									16	Camus,	The	Rebel,	262.	17	Ibid.,	261.	18	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	201.	19	Ibid.,	201.	20 	Martin	 Heidegger,	 Being	 and	 Time,	 trans.	 Joan	 Stambaugh	 (Albany:	 SUNY	 Press,	 19??)	Heidegger	 (BT,	 III.	 “The	Worldliness	 of	 the	World,”	 59),	 clarified	 ‘world’	 to	 be	 understood	 in	several	ways,	including	“the	totality	of	being	which	can	be	objectively	present	within	the	world,”	also	“as		that	‘in	which’	a	factical	Dasein	‘lives’.”		Later,	in	section	17	“Reference	and	Signs”	(71	ff.)	he	writes,	“reference	and	the	referential	totality	were	in	some	sense	constitutive	of	worldliness	itself.”		Thus	Heidegger	says	(80-81):	“As	that	for	which	one	lets	beings	be	encountered	in	the	kind	
of	being	of	relevance,	the	wherein	of	self-referential	understanding	is	the	phenomenon	of	world.”	21	Camus,	Le	mythe	de	Sisyphe	 (Editions	 Gallimard,	 1942),	writes:	 “Les	 conquérants	 savent	que	
l’action	est	en	elle-même	inutile.	Il	n’y	a	qu’une	action	utile,	celle	qui	referait	l’homme	et	la	terre.	Je	
ne	referai	jamais	les	hommes.	Mais	il	faut	faire	‘comme	si’.”		
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meaning,	 we	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 subsequent	 statement	 complicating	 the	interpretation.		Despite	saying	he	shall	never	remake	humankind,	Camus	utters	a	
general	 imperative	that	seemingly	excludes	him	but	not	us:	“One”	must	do	this,	he	says;	“one”	must	remake	both	humankind	and	the	world,	but	…	as	if…,	comme	
si.			 Who	is	this	“one”	who	must	do	so?	What	does	Camus	mean	here?	 	What	does	it	mean	to	say,	‘as	if’,	‘comme	si’?	Is	this	the	logic	of	the	subjunctive—to	say,	‘as	it	were’,	thus	to	say,	‘One	must	remake	humankind	and	the	world…as	it	were’?	Or,	is	it	the	word	of	the	epistemological	and	moral	skeptic—‘as	if’	alike	to	saying,	
‘well,	not	quite’;	 ‘well,	not	really’;	 ‘No,	I	don’t	really	mean	that’;	 ‘No,	I	don’t	really	
believe	that’;	‘I	mean,	as	if	that	were	true…but	not	really’;	and	so	on?		Does	Camus	mean	 that	 one	must	 act	 to	 remake	humankind	 and	 the	world	as	 if	 it	were	true	that	one	could	remake	humankind,	even	as	if	it	were	true	that	one	should	remake	humankind	 and	 the	 world,	 thus	 to	 take	 up	 the	 imperative	 as	 if	 it	 were	 an	imperative,	even	if,	were	we	pressed,	we	would	answer	‘Really,	truly	speaking,	it	is	 not	 an	 imperative’?	 	 Camus	 uses	 ‘one’	 to	 denote	 what	 is	 impersonal	 and	anonymous.		But,	this	‘one’	he	expects	to	be	made	personal	when	a	given	person	“enters	 in	with	his	revolt	and	his	 lucidity.”	 	 Indeed,	relative	 to	morality,	Camus	tells	us,	“Man	can	allow	himself	to	denounce	the	total	injustice	of	the	world	and	then	demand	a	total	justice	that	he	alone	will	create.”22		But	 one	 must	 clarify	 Camus’s	 ‘comme	 si’	 here.	 	 Consider	 examples	 of	common	usage:23		
Usage	1	means:	“in	such	a	way	that	something	seems	to	be	true,”	e.g.,	a) ‘It	looks	as	if	it’s	going	to	rain.’	b) ‘Jack	smiled	as	though	[as	if]	he	was	[were]	enjoying	a	private	joke.’	
Usage	 2	means:	 “used	 when	 you	 are	 describing	 something	 and	 you	imagine	an	explanation	for	it	that	you	know	is	not	the	real	one,”	e.g.,	a) ‘The	 house	was	 in	 such	 a	mess—it	 looked	 as	 though	 [as	 if]	 a	bomb	had	dropped	on	it.’	
Usage	3	means:	 “spoken	 used	 for	 emphasizing	 that	 something	 is	 not	true	or	is	not	important,”	e.g.,	a) ‘Don't	 get	 lost	 or	 anything,	 will	 you?’	 [One	 answers:]	 ‘As	 if	 I	would	[get	lost]—I’m	not	stupid.’	b) ‘Why	was	he	worrying	about	the	interview?—As	if	it	mattered	anyway!’	c) ‘As	 if’.	 .	 .	 ‘comme	si.	 .	 .’	 	 Does	 Camus	 utter	 an	 imperative	 such	that	 he	 really,	 truly,	 does	 mean	 that	 you	 and	 I	 must	 remake	humankind	 and	 remake	 the	 world,	 our	 freedom	 countering	nihilism?		Camus,	 informing	 us	 of	 his	 epistemological	 comportment,	 admits	 he	 does	 not	
know	“whether	this	world	has	a	meaning	that	transcends	it.”24	He	also	asserts	it																																																									22	Camus,	The	Rebel,	258.	23	Macmillan	Dictionary,	“as	if”,	https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/as-if,	accessed	18	July	2019.	
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is	impossible	for	him		“just	now	to	know	it,”	thus	possibly	later	knowing	so.		His	sense	 of	 the	 human	 condition,	 such	 as	 he	 experienced	 it	 in	 post-WW2	Europe	after	the	Holocaust,	 the	atomic	bombing	of	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki,	 the	failure	of	 communist	 revolution,	 etc.,	 did	 not	 provide	 him	 the	 knowledge	 he	 desired.		For	him,	action	integrates	human	and	world	and	works	to	alter	it	without	moral	nihilism.	 	 Where	 there	 is	 no	 absolute	 negation	 there	 is	 yet	 reason	 to	 live:	 “I	proclaim	 that	 I	 believe	 in	 nothing	 and	 that	 everything	 is	 absurd,	 but	 I	 cannot	doubt	 the	 validity	 of	 my	 proclamation	 and	 I	 must	 at	 least	 believe	 in	 my	protest.”25		Cautious	of	excess,	of	transgressing	the	limit,	Camus	hopes	“for	a	new	creation.”		 One	must	 answer	what	 one	means	 by	 ‘world’.	 	 It	 is	 not	merely	 the	 life-world	(Lebenswelt)	conceptualized	by	Husserl	and	Heidegger	or	 the	environing	physical	world	that	is	“the	planet	Earth.”	There	is	a	temporal	element	involved	in	living.		One	can	(a)	merely	await	the	future,	passively	present,	surrendered	to	the	dominion	of	the	past	as	it	governs	the	present;	or	(b)	one	can	engage	the	future	in	 anticipatory	 resolve,	 attentive	 to	 individual	 and	 collective	 potentiality-for-being,	the	future	governing	the	present	through	that	resolve.	 	Camus	seems	not	to	 appreciate	 this	 distinction,	 however.	 	 He	 says:	 “Real	 generosity	 toward	 the	future	 lies	 in	 giving	 all	 to	 the	 present.”26		 Does	 this	 mean,	 therefore,	 that—in	view	of	contemporary	concerns—there	can	be	no	reasonable	appeal	to	a	broad	principle	of	morality	such	as	asserts	“duties	to	future	generations,”	or	a	principle	of	 “responsibility	 to	 protect”	 the	 present,	 including	 persons,	 the	 environment,	etc.?	 		 The	 answers	 are	 unclear	 in	 Camus’s	 texts.	 	 He	 allows	 “for	 those	 who,	without	 concluding,	 continue	 questioning.”27	We	 must	 continue	 questioning—such	 is	 his	 imperative	 countering	 the	 unjust	 act	 of	 suicide.	 	 Camus	 does	 not	appeal	to	“an	eternal	idea	of	justice.”		On	the	contrary,	“If	injustice	is	bad	for	the	rebel”—for	Camus,	it	is—“it	is	[bad]…because	it…kills	the	small	part	of	existence	that	can	be	realized	on	this	earth	through	the	mutual	understanding	of	men.		In	the	 same	 way,	 since	 the	 man	 who	 lies	 shuts	 himself	 off	 from	 the	 other	 man,	falsehood	 is	 therefore	 proscribed	 and,	 on	 a	 slightly	 lower	 level,	 murder	 and	violence,	which	impose	definitive	silence.”28	Camus	sides	with	Plato	and	dialectic	to	clarify	moral	rectitude:	“Plato	is	right	and	not	Moses	and	Nietzsche.		Dialogue	on	 the	 level	 of	mankind	 is	 less	 costly	 than	 the	 gospel	 preached	 by	 totalitarian	regimes	in	the	form	of	a	monologue	dictated	from	the	top	of	a	lonely	mountain.”		To	refuse	Moses	is	to	refuse	the	transcendent	as	source	of	an	a	priori	morality;	to	refuse	 Nietzsche	 is	 to	 refuse	 moral	 nihilism	 and	 master-slave	 morality.	 Thus,	“The	logic	of	the	rebel	is	to	want	to	serve	justice	so	as	not	to	add	to	the	injustice	of	 the	 human	 condition…and	 to	 wager,	 in	 spite	 of	 human	 misery,	 for	happiness.”29																																																																																																																																																																24	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	38.	25	Camus,	The	Rebel,	10.	26	Ibid.,	304.	27	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	7.	28	Camus,	The	Rebel,	283.	29	Ibid.,	285.	
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Through	 dialectic	 one	 attains	mutual	 understanding,	 keeping	 the	 future	remains	 open	 and	 disclosing	 meaningful	 possibilities.	 	 Camus	 gives	 all	 to	 the	present,	 intentionally	 being	 generous,	 giving	 all,	 to	 the	 future.	 	 One	 does	 not,	therefore,	ignore	the	demands	of	the	future.		One	accounts	for	them	by	giving	all	to	the	present.30		The	problem	of	suicide	is	faced	directly,	as	foil	to	the	threat	of	nihilism.31		 Early	 in	The	Myth	of	 Sisyphus,	 Camus	 remarks	 that	 there	 are	 those	who	 say	 ‘no’	 to	 suicide	 but	who	 “act	 as	 if	 they	 thought	 ‘yes’.”	 	 Here	 the	 ‘as	 if’	relates	 thought	 and	 deed:	 One	 thinks	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 suicide	 is	‘yes’,	 suicide	 thus	permitted,	 if	 not	obligatory;	but,	 one	 says	 ‘no’,	 in	which	 case	one	 does	 not	 commit	 suicide.	 	 Perhaps	 one	 says	 ‘no’	 impulsively;	 for,	 Camus	reminds,	“We	get	into	the	habit	of	living	before	acquiring	the	habit	of	thinking.”		The	 earlier	 habit	 of	 living,	 countervailing	 the	 latter,	 is	 potent,.	 	 To	 continue	questioning	is	to	assure	oneself	of	a	tomorrow.	 	One	anticipates	the	eventuality	of	 an	 answer	 while	 doubting	 reason’s	 potency.	 	We	 recognize	 our	 longing	 for	tomorrow	as	a	sign	of	“the	revolt	of	the	flesh”	against	the	absurd.		The	fact	of	revolt	is	itself	a	sign	of	deference	to	the	claim	the	future	makes	on	us	when	one	feels	the	world	in	all	its	estrangement,	where	the	True,	the	Good,	and	the	Beautiful	seem	to	be	without	meaning.	Rejecting	a	formal	ethics,	Camus	opines:	“No	code	of	ethics	and	no	effort	are	justifiable	a	priori	in	the	face	of	the	cruel	mathematics	 that	 command	 our	 condition.”32		 Thus	 Camus	 rejects	moral	justification	 a	 priori,	 leaving	 room	 for	 an	 a	 posteriori	 warrant	 in	 ordinary	experience.		If	we	are	to	remake	humankind	and	the	world,	then	we	must	attend	to	consequences.	 	To	attend	to	the	consequences	of	our	deeds	is	to	attend	to	the	claim	of	 the	 future	upon	 the	present.	 That	 is	why	Camus	would	 give	 all	 to	 the	present.	 	 One	 gives	 all	 to	 the	 present	 in	 view	 of	 consequences,	 accounting	 for	what	tomorrow	can	bring	beyond	the	“successive	regrets	and	impotences”	that	the	history	of	human	thought	has	delivered	us.		The	 world	 is	 not	 reasonable	 relative	 to	 Camus’s	 interrogation	 of	 the	conditions	 of	 life	 experienced	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 	 But,	reason	 persists,	 insisting	 on	 its	 “adventure.”	 Even	 if	 reason	 lacks	 apodictic	efficacy	 it	nonetheless	possesses	and	manifests	an	 intensity	of	hopes.	With	this	hope	we	may	see	the	way	forward	to	“revolt	against	the	irremediable,”33	finding	small	 consolation	 against	 the	 absurd,	 even	 if	 with	 a	 limited	 efficacy.	 	 Camus	counsels:	“But	he	who	dedicates	himself	to	the	duration	of	his	life,	to	the	house	he	 builds,	 to	 the	 dignity	 of	mankind,	 dedicates	 himself	 to	 the	 earth	 and	 reaps	from	it	the	harvest	that	sows	its	seed	and	sustains	the	world	again	and	again.”34		Camus,	in	a	quintessentially	Nietzschean	move,	may	ask	too	much	of	humankind																																																									30	Despite	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 Christian	 gospel,	 it	 is	 as	 if	 Camus	 appropriates	 the	 adage	 that	counsels	taking	care	of	today	so	that	thereby	tomorrow	will	take	care	of	itself.			31	Ingrid	L.	Anderson,	“Absurd	Dignity:	The	Rebel	and	His	Cause	in	Améry	and	Camus,”	Journal	of	
French	 and	 Francophone	 Philosophy—Revue	 de	 la	 philosophie	 française	 et	 de	 langue	 française	24(3),	(2016):	74-94,	at	77,	observes:	“Camus	argues	convincingly	that	the	revolutionary	desire	for	a	perfected,	 inevitable	 future,	when	coupled	with	ethical	and	philosophical	bankruptcy,	not	only	rationalizes	the	suspension	of	morality,	but	also	ultimately	necessitates	it.		The	rejection	of	what	is	eventually	requires	the	elaboration	of	what	ought	to	be…”	32	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	16.	33	Ibid.,	25.	34	Camus,	The	Rebel,	302.	
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and	the	world;	for,	he	desires	“everything	to	be	explained”	to	him	or,	failing	that,	then	“nothing.”			In	 Beyond	 Good	 and	 Evil,	 Nietzsche	 asks	 a	 set	 of	 questions	 about	 God:	“Why	atheism	today?	 .	 .	 .	 ‘the	 father’	 in	God	has	been	thoroughly	refuted;	ditto,	‘the	judge’,	‘the	rewarder’.		Also	his	‘free	will’:	he	does	not	hear—and	if	he	heard	he	still	would	not	know	how	to	help.	 	Worst	of	all:	he	seems	 incapable	of	clear	communication;	 is	 he	 unclear?”35	Not	 surprising	 then	 that	 Camus	 asserts,	 “The	world	 itself,	 whose	 single	 meaning	 [he	 does]	 not	 understand,	 is	 but	 a	 vast	irrational.”	 He	 asserts	 his	 belief:	 “The	 absurd	 is	 born	 of	 this	 confrontation	between	 the	 human	 need	 and	 the	 unreasonable	 silence	 of	 the	 world.”36		 This	belief	 qua	 fact	 must	 not	 be	 forgotten,	 hence	 his	 imperative:	 	 If	 one	 must	 not	forget,	 then	 one	must	 continue	 the	 adventure	 of	 thought.	 That	 adventure	 calls	forth	 the	 deeds	 that	 would,	 if	 they	 could,	 if	 they	 should—comme	 si—remake	humankind	and	the	world.	 	The	three	strands	of	the	subjunctive,	the	indicative,	and	the	imperative	are	engaged,	directing	both	deliberation	and	choice.		What	are	the	conclusions	of	philosophy	such	as	Camus	articulates	them	in	his	 interrogation	of	 the	absurd?	 	To	say	 ‘x	is	absurd’	 is	 to	say	 that	one	 faces	an	apparent	 material	 impossibility,	 or	 a	 contradiction	 of	 belief	 concerning	 some	presumed	fact	of	experience.		What	happens,	then,	if	one	says,	e.g.,	‘It	is	absurd	to	
think	one	must	remake	humankind	and	the	world,’	and	then	to	say	further	‘it	is,	
therefore,	 absurd	 in	 the	 extreme	 to	 attempt	 to	 remake	 both	 humankind	 and	world’?		Or,	returning	to	our	initial	question:	If	one	cannot	remove	the	absurdity	at	all,	are	we	then	to	give	place	to	reason’s	intensity	of	hope,	in	particular	when	one	says	the	foregoing	but	adds,	perhaps	reluctantly,	‘as	if’,	‘comme	si’?		Must	one	not	consider	one’s	aim	and	one’s	strength,	thus	to	dispose	an	act	proportionate	to	the	 aim	 in	 view?	 Camus	 sets	 up	 a	 logical	 reality,	 i.e.,	 a	 logical	 possibility.	 He	would	have	us	 think	of	a	material	 reality,	not	 to	 leave	 the	aim	“impotent.”	The	transition	between	 logical	 and	material	 reality	 is	 itself	 a	 creative	 act,	 an	 act	 of	remaking,	if	one	could,	if	one	thinks	one	should.		For	Camus	 the	 absurd	 is	 present	 in	 the	 conjunction	of	 the	human	mind	and	the	world.	 	Any	attempt	to	solve	a	problem	works	with	experience	of	both.		Hence,	Camus	the	man	understands	himself	to	have	deep	feelings	concerning	the	absurd.		This	depth	of	feeling	means	he	cannot	fully	fathom	what	he	is	conscious	of	saying.		Hence,	when	he	speaks	his	seeming	imperative	to	remake	humankind	and	 the	 world,	 one	 may	 argue,	 on	 his	 own	 position	 Camus	 is	 not	 entirely	conscious	of	what	 remaking	humankind	and	 the	world	entails.	 	He	hesitates	 in	the	 very	moment	 he	 utters	 the	 imperative,	 hence	 the	 ‘comme	si’.	 	 He	 does	 not	know—we	do	not	know—whether	to	take	the	imperative	seriously	and	grant	it	practical	veracity.		For	Camus,	 ‘world’	references	both	a	metaphysic	(for	Europe	since	Plato,	that	means	all	Nietzsche	 sought	 to	overturn	and	 transvalue)	and	an	attitude	of	
mind—since	Plato	and	Aristotle,	 an	ontological	 commitment	 that	 is	 essentialist																																																									35	Friedrich	 Nietzsche,	 Beyond	 Good	 and	 Evil,	 trans.	 W.	 Kaufmann	 (New	 York:	 Vintage	 Books,	1966),	66.	36	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	28.	
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and	 archeological-teleological,	 and	 since	 the	 Church	 Fathers	 all	 that	 is	eschatological.		But,	there	is	more	here.		Camus	asserts,	“a	man	defines	himself	by	his	make-believe	 as	well	 as	 by	 his	 sincere	 impulses.”37		 To	 utter	 a	 proposition	and	add	‘as	if’,	‘comme	si’,	as	Camus	does,	is	to	introduce	a	move	in	thought	from	the	sincere	 to	 the	make-believe—to,	what	offers	 itself	as	 logical	possibility,	but	
perhaps	 also	 as	 material	 possibility.	 	 Camus	 claims	 that	 methods	 disclose	unconsciously	 present	 conclusions,	 though	 one	 claims	 not	 to	 know	 them	 yet.		Camus’s	 quasi-existentialist	 method	 of	 analysis,	 his	 sense	 of	 the	 moral	 in	 the	linkage	 of	 the	 sincere	 and	 the	 make-believe,	 moves	 him	 unconsciously	 to	entertain	the	make-believe—not	in	some	pejorative	sense	of	installing	oneself	in	fantasy,	 but	 in	 the	 positive	 sense	 of	 intuiting	 a	 logical	 reality	 that	 has	 some	promise	of	material	possibility,	hence	of	“remaking”	the	present	of	humanity	and	the	world.	 	 If	 his	method	 “acknowledges	 the	 feeling	 that	 all	 true	 knowledge	 is	impossible,”	then	we	are	left	with	the	task	of	navigating	appearances,	 including	the	 totality	 of	 the	 manifest	 irrationality	 of	 human	 existence	 and	 the	 world.		Camus	counsels	 “an	active	consent	 to	 the	relative”	as	one’s	 lucid	 fidelity	 to	 the	human	 condition. 38 		 One’s	 aims	 are	 always	 approximate,	 never	 realized	completely.		The	first	rule	of	conduct,	then,	Camus	articulates	thus:	“To	conquer	existence,	we	must	start	from	the	small	amount	of	existence	we	find	in	ourselves	and	not	deny	it	from	the	very	beginning.”39		This	rule	insists	on	the	consequent	imperative	 of	 absolute	 self-expression;	 in	 the	 dialectic	 one	 speaks	 against	 the	overbearing	silence	of	the	world.		To	 acknowledge	 the	 absurd	 is	 a	 positive	 moment	 in	 human	 existence;	one’s	consciousness	awakened	to	irrationality	in	human	experience.		When	that	happens	 it	 “provokes	 what	 follows.”	 	 An	 awakened	 consciousness	 of	 the	absurdity	 of	 human	 existence	 is	 a	 provocation	 that	 dismisses	 the	 option	 of	suicide	 and	 raises	 to	 the	 individual	 his	 or	 her	 conscience:	 One	 must	 remake	
humankind	and	the	world,	even	if	one	utters	the	seemingly	necessary	refrain—‘as	if’,	‘comme	si’.		This	imperative	is	the	requisite	response	to	the	fact	of	the	absurd.	This	is	not	to	say	that	one	identifies	objects	that	incite	our	fear.		Instead,	Camus	means	here	what	Heidegger	 calls	dread	 (Angst),	 understood	ontologically,	 thus	without	specific	object.	 	 In	 the	acknowledgement	of	dread,	 “one”	must	move	to	remake	humankind	and	the	world,	even	if	we	are	to	conclude	that	Camus	himself	cannot,	or	shall	not,	do	so.40		Why	 should	we	 defer	 to	 this	 seeming	 imperative	 to	 remake	 humankind	and	 world?	 	 That	 is	 a	 question	 of	 justification	 of	 an	 ethics,	 such	 as	 Hochberg	demanded	of	Camus.	 	Camus	provides	a	pertinent	insight,	telling	us	that	nature	negates	 us,	 that	 “At	 the	 heart	 of	 all	 beauty	 lies	 something	 inhuman…[but	 that	indeed	 the]	 primitive	 hostility	 of	 the	 world	 rises	 up	 to	 face	 us	 across	millennia”41—and	it	is	an	irrational	hostility,	despite	the	“images	and	designs”	by	which	we	have	sought	to	make	sense	of	it.		These	images	and	designs	are	signs	of																																																									37	Ibid.,	11.	38	Camus,	The	Rebel,	290.	39	Ibid.,	291.	40	Camus’s	own	involvement	in	the	resistance	movement	and	later	journalistic	activity	attests	to	his	inclination	to	act	to	remake	the	world	as	he	encountered	it	during	his	day.	41	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	14.	
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human	 artifice,	 of	 how	 we	 have	 worked	 to	 make	 sense	 of,	 and	 otherwise	construct,	 the	world	 in	which	we	have	our	being.	 	However,	 in	 the	provocation	that	is	the	consciousness	of	the	absurd,	such	artifice	becomes	useless.		In	that	moment	Camus	would	say	that	it	is	“useful”	to	us	to	remake	both	humankind	and	the	world.		This	is	the	moment	for	the	onset	of	a	new	artifice,	the	artifice	that	works	with	consciousness	of	the	absurd	that	was	felt	before	but	was	not	admitted	as	such	into	daily	discourse.	Camus	will	not	stand	passively	before	Nietzsche’s	 “nay-saying,”	 or	 Kierkegaard’s	 sickness	 unto	 death,	 or	 Sartre’s	nausea	and	mauvaise	foi,	not	even	Heidegger’s	enigmatic	Angst.	 	He	is	prepared	to	 ask:	 “how	 far	 is	 one	 to	 go	 to	 elude	 nothing?” 42 		 With	 this	 question,	consciousness	 of	 the	 absurd	 invokes	 the	 conscience	 that	would,	 if	 it	 could,	 if	 it	should,	respond	to	the	call	to	remake	both	humankind	and	the	world.	One	does	not	 remake	with	 caprice.	 	 Rather,	 “When	 the	 throne	 of	 God	 is	 overturned,	 the	rebel	 realizes	 that	 it	 is	 now	his	 own	 responsibility	 to	 create	 the	 justice,	 order,	and	 unity	 that	 he	 sought	 in	 vain	within	 his	 own	 condition,	 and	 in	 this	way	 to	justify	 the	 fall	 of	 God.”43		 Here,	 perhaps,	 Camus	 appropriates	 the	 insight	 of	Parain,	realizing	that	“Our	language	is	neither	true	nor	false.		It	is	simultaneously	useful	and	dangerous,	necessary	and	pointless.”44		Camus	 appreciates	 that	 the	 utterance	 issuing	 from	 conscience	 is	 not	 a	matter	of	distinguishing	the	true	and	the	false.	 	Hence,	such	utterance	does	not	place	us	before	a	possible	contradiction,	 that	effort	at	 logic	 “in	which	 the	mind	that	studies	itself	gets	lost	in	a	giddy	whirling.”45		The	intensity	of	hope	that	one	may	 feel	 is	 not	 grounded	 in	 apodictic	 knowledge;	 hence,	 no	 justification	 qua	demonstration	of	certitude	can	be	given.		All	creative	acts	produce	constructions,	images	and	designs	of	 the	human	mind.	 	The	present	 task	 that	 is	conscientious,	while	 being	 conscious	 of	 the	 absurd,	 is	 to	 recognize	 that	 these	 images	 and	designs,	 while	 not	 certain	 have	 their	 utility.	 	 To	 remake	 humankind	 and	 the	world	 is	 a	 task	 to	be	undertaken	without	 the	 illusion	of	 certainty,	 and	without	the	pretense	to	knowledge.		But,	the	question	remains:	How	far	shall	we	go?	
	The	“Ethics”	of	the	Absurd		For	Camus	 there	must	be	a	 logic	of	which	human	existence	 is	capable,	 i.e.,	 that	conduces	 to	human	existence,	not	 to	 suicide.	He	allows	 that	 the	 absurd	has	 its	own	 “commandments”	 calling	 forth	 our	 action,	 without	 escapism	 into	 the	transcendent.	 	 There	 are	 two	 commands	 in	 dilemma:	 (1)	 Live	 (aware	 of	 the	absurd);	 (2)	 Die	 (lucid	 of	 one’s	 mortality).	 	 While	 doubting	 the	 authority	 of	apodictic	reason	Camus	nonetheless	concedes:	“It	is	useless	to	negate	the	reason	absolutely.		It	has	its	order	in	which	it	is	efficacious.”46		To	that	degree,	one	need	not,	e.g.,	yield	to	the	absurd	in	the	Kierkegaardian	sense	that,	Camus	says,	follows	Ignatius	of	Loyola	in	sacrificing	the	intellect	 in	favor	of	divine	superintendence.		Camus	 sets	his	 standard:	 “I	want	 to	know	whether	 I	 can	 live	with	what	I	know																																																									42	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	16.	43	Camus,	The	Rebel,	25.	44	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	237.	45	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	17.	46	Ibid.,	36.	
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and	with	 that	 alone.”47		 Not	 willing	 to	 sacrifice	 the	 intellect,	 Camus	 concedes:	“But	 if	 I	 recognize	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 reason,	 I	 do	 not	 therefore	 negate	 it,	recognizing	 its	 relative	 powers.”48		 Rather	 than	 seek	 the	 rationalist	 aim	 of	apodictic	truth,	Camus	seeks	what	is	desirable	within	the	limits	of	relative	truths.		“Ethics”	would	have	to	be	articulated	within	those	parameters.			 One	 who	 despairs	 of	 life	 yields	 to	 the	 nihilist	 temptation	 and	 commits	suicide.		Camus,	however,	recognizing	the	limit	of	human	reason,	presses	against	that	 limit,	 asking	 how	 far	 one	 will	 go.	 Life	 is	 lived	 all	 the	 better	 if	 it	 has	 no	meaning,	i.e.,	no	meaning	such	as	provided	by	the	metaphysics	appealing	to	the	transcendent.	He	clarifies	his	aim:	“In	fact,	our	aim	is	to	shed	light	upon	the	step	taken	 by	 the	 mind	 when,	 starting	 from	 a	 philosophy	 of	 the	 world’s	 lack	 of	meaning,	it	ends	up	by	finding	a	meaning	and	depth	in	it.”49		That	meaning	is	not	the	 leap	 to	 faith	 that	 installs	 religious	 meaning.	 	 Neither	 is	 it	 found	 in	 the	phenomenologist’s	 intentionality	 that	 enumerates	 and	 describes	 phenomena	without	explaining	them.		So,	Camus	is	left	to	his	own	rational	devices,	allowing	what	he	knows	and	 that	 alone.	 	This	 is	 a	 function	of	belief	 that	 admits	of	 very	limited	evidence.		Thus,	Camus	says:	“What	I	believe	to	be	true	I	must	therefore	preserve.”50		This	is	sign	of	his	“conscious	revolt.”		Insisting	on	an	ethics	of	revolt	rather	than	renounce	life	in	the	face	of	the	absurd,	he	will	not	suffer	to	have	his	and	our	freedom	of	rebellion	abolished.				 At	 this	 point	 one	 aware	 of	 the	 absurd	 takes	 up	 the	 charge	 of	 conscious	revolt,	acting	according	to	an	‘as	if’…	‘comme	si.’		For,	Camus	asserts	that	it	is	then	that	one	“thinks	that	something	in	his	life	can	be	directed.		In	truth,	he	acts	as	if	he	were	free,	even	if	all	the	facts	make	a	point	of	contradicting	that	liberty.”51		We	have	 here,	 then,	 a	 specific	 understanding	 of	 Camus’s	 sense	 of	 the	 ‘as	 if’	 that	concerned	us	at	 the	outset.	 	 If	one	 is	 to	remake	humankind	and	the	world,	one	does	 so	 not	 knowing	 that	 one	 is	 free	 (in	 the	 metaphysical	 sense).		Notwithstanding,	one	can	engage	the	present	with	a	view	to	the	future,	acting	as	
if	one	is	free	to	do	so,	giving	all	to	the	present	thereby	in	generosity	to	the	future.		Camus	will	say	here	 ‘as	 if’	because,	as	he	again	concedes:	“But	at	 the	moment	I	am	well	aware	that	the	higher	liberty,	that	freedom	to	be,	which	alone	can	serve	as	basis	 for	a	 truth,	does	not	exist.”52		That	awareness	does	not	preclude	one’s	action	in	which	one	believes	and	pronounces:	‘I	do	so	as	if	I	were	free…’		 Problematic	in	our	effort	to	glean	an	ethos	from	Camus	that	accounts	for	the	future,	however,	is	his	declaration:	“The	absurd	enlightens	me	on	this	point:	
there	is	no	future.”53		What	is	the	implication	here?	 	 Is	one	to	say:	 ‘If	 there	is	no	future,	then	there	is	only	the	present,’	 in	which	case	one	commits	one’s	actions	entirely	to	the	present?		If	that	is	what	Camus	intends—such	that	one	can,	hence,	have	an	attitude	of	indifference	to	the	future—then	(a)	there	is	no	obvious	duty	to																																																									47	Ibid.,	40;	italics	added.	48	Ibid.,	40.	49	Ibid.,	42.	50	Ibid.,	52.	51	Ibid.,	57;	emphasis	added.	52	Ibid.,	57.	53	Ibid.,	58;	emphasis	added.	
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future	generations	of	humanity	and	(b)	 there	 is	no	responsibility	 to	protect	 the	present	in	view	of	ostensible	duty.	 	There	seems	to	be	no	imperative	to	remake	humankind	 or	 the	world;	 for,	 that	 is	 “non-sensical”	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 claim	 that	there	 is	 no	 future.	 	 	 But,	 one	 must	 be	 cautious	 here,	 since,	 in	 Camus’s	 sense,	‘future’	 has	 onto-theo-logical	 connotations	 that	 include	 teleology	 and	eschatology,	 both	 of	 which	 Camus	 rejected	 as	 part	 of	 Nietzsche’s	 anti-metaphysical	position.			 Where	 does	 this	 put	 us	 in	 our	 effort	 to	 articulate	 a	 coherent	 ethics?		Camus	 opines:	 “I	 see,	 then,	 that	 the	 individual	 character	 of	 a	 common	 code	 of	ethics	 lies	not	 so	much	 in	 the	 ideal	 importance	of	 its	basic	principles	 as	 in	 the	norm	 of	 an	 experience	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 measure.”54		 Entirely	 salient	 and	informing	his	ethics,	Camus	contraposes	ideal	principles	and	norms	of	experience.	
Experience	provides	the	norm,	not	the	a	priori,	not	the	prima	facie,	not	abstract	principles.		Further,	one	must	mean	here	an	experience	one	can	measure.		Hence,	if	 one	 asserts	 a	 responsibility	 to	 the	 present,	 then	 this	must	 be	warranted	 by	lived	 experience.	 A	 measure	 must	 be	 given.	 	 It	 seems,	 therefore,	 (a)	 if	 the	condition	sine	qua	non	 is	 experience	 (consistent	with	empiricist	epistemology),	and	logically	(b)	one	has	no	experience	of	the	future	(one	can	have	only	hopes),	clearly	the	future	does	not	dispose	itself	in	the	present	to	claim	us	by	way	of	an	a	
priori	moral	imperative.		Hence,	one	cannot	find	it	meaningful	to	assert	such	an	imperative	 to	 remake	 humankind	 and	 to	 remake	 the	 world	 thereby.	 	 The	imperative	cannot	be	“truly,	really,	so”;	it	can	be	an	imperative	only	 ‘as	if’	true…	‘comme	si	c'était	vrai.’			 But	 we	 get	 ahead	 of	 ourselves.	 	 We	 must	 ask:	 Which	 “man”	 is	 to	 be	remade?		Is	it	“man”	who	appeals	to	the	transcendent,	“ideal	man”	who	has	hope	of	 eternity	 and	 victory	 over	 individual	 death	 that	 is	 otherwise	 absurd?	 	 Is	 it	“absurd	man”	in	the	flesh,	lucid	enough	to	be	aware	of	his	absurd	existence,	who	therefore	 takes	 on	 (because	 he	 gives	 to	 himself)	 the	 task	 of	 conscious	 revolt?		Following	Nietzsche,	Camus	would	have	us	remake	the	former	as	“type.”		But,	to	speak	of	the	latter	type	is	also	to	allow	for	a	remaking—because,	the	absurd	man,	Camus	 claims,	 is	 “[a]ssured	 of	 his	 temporally	 limited	 freedom,	 of	 his	 revolt	devoid	of	future,	and	of	his	mortal	consciousness;”	in	that	case	“he	lives	out	his	adventure	within	the	span	of	his	lifetime.”	 	This	seems	problematic,	however,	if	one	is	to	speak	of	an	ethics	in	the	classical	sense	of	concern	for	alterity.	 	Camus	thinks	a	man	in	revolt	shields	his	action	“from	any	judgment	but	his	own”—the	rebel	is	indifferent	to	any	claim	from	alterity,	even	seemingly	indifferent	to	any	claim	from	posterity.		Camus	asserts	starkly:		There	can	be	no	holding	forth	on	ethics.		I	have	seen	people	behave	badly	with	 great	morality	 and	 I	 note	 every	 day	 that	 integrity	 has	 no	 need	 of	rules.		There	is	but	one	moral	code	that	the	absurd	man	can	accept,	the	one	that	is	not	separated	from	God:	the	one	that	is	dictated.		But	it	so	happens	that	 he	 lives	 outside	 that	 God.	 	 As	 for	 the	 others	 (I	 mean	 also	
																																																								54	Ibid.,	61.	
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immoralism),	the	absurd	man	sees	nothing	in	them	but	justifications	and	he	has	nothing	to	justify.55		Camus	identifies	here	a	contradiction.	Those	who	posit	ethical	codes	but	whose	practice	 is	 contrary	 are	 hence	 without	 truth	 or	 efficacy.	 	 But,	 his	 experience	informs	 him	 of	 individuals	 having	 moral	 integrity	 without	 ground	 in	 obvious	maxims	of	conduct	(whether	subjectively	or	objectively	valid).		Further,	Camus	is	aware	of	 those	who	 insist	on	 ‘immoralism’,	 asserting	 ‘Everything	 is	permitted’.			Camus	 is	 quick	 to	 clarify:	 What	 matters	 is	 to	 understand	 this	 assertion	 as	 “a	bitter	acknowledgment	of	a	fact,”	viz.,	a	person	possesses	“the	ability	to	behave	badly	with	impunity,”	such	evil	conduct	part	of	ordinary	experience.		 Camus,	however,	does	not	accept	 this	vulgar	sense	that,	e.g.,	Dostoevsky	seems	 to	 express	 through	 Ivan	 in	 The	 Brothers	 Karamazov.	 	 Camus	 is	 quite	definitive:	 “The	 absurd	 does	 not	 liberate;	 it	 binds.	 	 It	 does	 not	 authorize	 all	
actions.”56		This	is	so	because	of	the	consequences	of	actions,	not	in	any	a	priori	or	prima	facie	 justification	such	given	in	Western	moral	philosophy.	Camus	is	a	consequentialist	(not	to	say	utilitarian)	 in	his	moral	demeanor;	 for,	he	assesses	that,	 “All	 systems	 of	 morality	 are	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 an	 action	 has	consequences	 that	 legitimize	 it	 or	 cancel	 it.” 57 		 He	 does	 not	 subscribe	 to	eudaemonist,	 utilitarian,	 or	 deontological	 systems	 of	 morality,	 since,	 “if	 all	experiences	are	indifferent,	that	of	duty	is	as	legitimate	as	any	other.		One	can	be	virtuous	 through	 a	whim.”58		 That	 opinion	will	 not	 satisfy	 an	 Aristotelian	 or	 a	Kantian,	obviously,	since	it	asserts	that	one	can	be	indifferent	to	moral	virtue	or	duty	 but	 perform	 according	 to	 duty	 as	 a	matter	 of	 inclination	 or	 self-interest.		This,	of	course,	is	not	the	“strict	motive”	of	respect	for	universal	law	or	appeal	to	the	“second	nature”	of	habitual	praxis.		Camus	 recognizes	 a	 practical	 link	 between	 past,	 present,	 and	 future	relative	 to	moral	 consequence,	without	privileging	 the	 authority	 of	 the	past	 or	the	claim	of	the	future:	“At	very	most,	such	a	mind	[that	of	a	responsible	person]	will	 consent	 to	 use	 past	 experience	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 its	 future	 actions.”59		 That	consent	 is	 merely	 a	 matter	 of	 fact	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 judgment.	 	 One	 may	 be	indifferent,	 but	 one	 has	 the	 freedom	 to	 consent	 or	 dissent.	 No	 apodictically	warranted	 imperative	 of	 action	 is	 presupposed;	 for,	 Camus	 asks	 (and	 not	rhetorically):	 “What	 rule,	 then,	 could	 emanate	 from	 that	 unreasonable	 order?		The	only	truth	that	might	seem	instructive	to	him	is	not	formal:	it	comes	to	life	and	unfolds	in	men.		The	absurd	mind	cannot	so	much	expect	ethical	rules	at	the	end	of	its	reasoning…”60	It	can	expect	only	“illustrations,”	“images,”	“constructs,”	from	 lived	 experience,	 where,	 because	 no	 one	 is	 “guilty”—e.g.,	 in	 reference	 to	some	 objectively	 valid	 maxim	 that	 warrants	 moral	 judgment—there	 are	 no	singular	exemplars	per	se.																																																										55	Ibid.,	66-67,	italics	added.	56	Ibid.,	67.	italics	added.	57	Ibid.,	67.	58	Ibid.,	67.	59	Ibid.,	67-68.	60	Ibid.,	68.	
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It	seems	Camus	insists,	then,	that	one’s	lived	experience	is	sufficient	to	the	deed	that	unfolds.	 	All	 that	matters	 is	 its	efficacy	 in	relation	to	 the	aim	and	the	strength	 invested.	 	 One	 may	 choose	 to	 be	 someone	 or	 something,	 even	 as,	conscious	of	one’s	mortality,	one	trembles.		One	can	be,	as	Camus	presents	these	two	 images,	 an	unrepentant	Don	 Juan	or	 a	 rebellious	 lady	of	 the	 stage	 such	as	Adrienne	Lecouvreur,	who	had	no	problem	presenting	herself	as	“an	unblushing	face	 to	 the	world”—Voltaire,	 in	poetic	 verse,	writing	 at	 her	death:	 “Should	 she	then,	breathless,	criminal	be	thought,	And	is	it	then	to	charm	the	world	a	fault?”61	In	choosing	thus,	each	plays	a	game;	and,	he	and	she	consent	to	the	rules	of	the	particular	game.		One	may,	of	course,	decline	to	play,	choose	a	different	game,	or	choose	no	game	at	all	(which	is,	in	effect,	the	choice	of	suicide).		It	is	thus	that	one	chooses	a	moral	code,	an	ethics	in	which	one	is	ever	conscious	of	one’s	mortality.		One	 subscribes	 to	 a	 maxim	 (the	 rule	 of	 the	 game)	 but	 only	 ‘as	 if’,	 ‘comme	 si’,	taking	it	as	if	true	in	the	moment	of	living	one’s	experience,	knowing	it	may	not	be	true.		This	is	a	“logical”	comportment”	Camus	argues.		Hence,	 not	 committing	 to	 an	 inductive	 logic	 of	 probable	 consequence,	Camus	 is	 nonetheless	 consequentialist	 in	 the	 lucidity	 of	 his	 comportment.	 	 He	appropriates	the	moment	as	lived	experience,	committing	to	living	what	unfolds	without	pretense	of	telos	or	eschaton.		That	is	why	he	speaks	of	Don	Juan	as	one	who	“achieves	a	knowledge	without	illusions	which	negates	everything	[men	of	God]	 profess,”	 even	 if	 such	men	 call	 down	 punishment	 upon	 his	 head	 for	 the	excesses	 of	 his	 interminable	 devotion	 to	 the	 flesh,	 his	 unbridled	 carnality	 and	debauchery.	 	 Similarly,	 Camus	 commends	 Adrienne	 who,	 he	 reminds,	 “on	 her	deathbed	was	willing	 to	 confess	and	 receive	 communion”—thus	as	a	good	and	convicted	 Catholic	 Christian	 is	 expected	 to	 do—but	 who,	 Camus	 observes,	“refused	 to	 abjure	 her	 profession.”62		 Is	 one	 to	 judge	 her	 guilty	 thereby,	 as	Voltaire	 asked,	 thus	 to	 condemn	 her	 for	 her	 choice,	 such	 as	 the	 Church	 did	 in	refusing	her	a	Christian	burial?		Camus	says	otherwise:		She	 thereby	 lost	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 confession.	 	 Did	 this	 not	 amount,	 in	effect,	to	choosing	her	absorbing	passion	in	preference	to	God?		And	that	woman	in	the	death	throes	refusing	in	tears	to	repudiate	what	she	called	her	art	gave	evidence	of	a	greatness	 that	she	never	achieved	behind	the	footlights.		This	was	her	finest	role	and	the	hardest	one	to	play.		Choosing	between	heaven	and	a	ridiculous	fidelity,	preferring	oneself	to	eternity	or	losing	oneself	 in	God	 is	 the	age-old	 tragedy	 in	which	each	must	play	his	part.63		Is	her	choice	absurd?	 	Nay;	not	 for	Camus.	 	 It	would	have	been	absurd	had	she	repudiated	her	art	upon	confession	and	communion.		That	maxim	she	declined	to	accept,	even	as	Don	Juan	declined	to	say	he	had	loved	“at	last”	and	said,	instead,	that	 always	 he	 loved	 “once	more.”	 	 As	 actor	 in	 his	 game	 and	 as	 actress	 in	 her	
																																																								61	Voltaire	 (Francois	 Marie	 Arouet),	 “On	 the	 Death	 of	 Adrienne	 LeCouvreur,	 A	 Celebrated	Actress,”	 https://www.poetry-archive.com/v/on_the_death_of_adrienne_lecouvreur.html,	accessed	25	July	2019).	62	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	83.	63	Ibid.,	83.	
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game,	 both	Don	 Juan	 and	Adrienne	 remade	 themselves—comme	si—at	 least	 in	the	persona	they	presented	to	others.64	
	The	“Ethics”	of	Conquest?		We	 return	 to	 the	 question	 that	 engages	 the	 conquerer’s	 claim	 that	 one	 must	remake	humankind	 and	 the	world	 as	 the	 only	meaningfully	 useful	 action.	 This	conquerer	who	would	 act	 so	 no	 longer	 conquers	 territories,	 not	 a	 conquest	 of	“the	earth”.	 	 Camus	 speaks	of	 conquest	 that	 “lies	 in	protest	 and	 the	blind-alley	sacrifice.”65 		 The	 modern	 conquerer	 seeks	 victory	 in	 rebellion	 as	 l’homme	
révolté—“revolution…accomplished	against	 the	gods”	as	with	Prometheus,	 “the	first	 of	modern	 conquerers.”	 	 One	 can	 choose	 to	 be	 a	modern	 conquerer:	 “The	conquerers	 are	 merely	 those	 among	 men	 who	 are	 conscious	 enough	 of	 their	strength	to	be	sure	of	living	constantly	on	those	heights	and	fully	aware	of	that	grandeur.”66		 Yet,	 they	 admit	 of	 death:	 “In	 the	 rebel’s	 universe,	 death	 exalts	injustice.	 	 It	 is	 the	 supreme	 abuse.”67		 But,	 the	 rebel	 chooses	 so	 rather	 than	choose	the	eternal	that	is	mere	illusion—for	him,	one	must	conquer	illusion	and	appropriate	one’s	lucidity,	even	at	the	point	of	death.			 Camus	 presented	 us	 with	 the	 images	 of	 Don	 Juan,	 Adrienne,	 and	 the	conquerer,	clear	that,	“these	images	do	not	propose	moral	codes	and	involve	no	judgments:	they	are	sketches.	 	They	merely	represent	a	style	of	 life.	 	The	 lover,	the	actor,	or	the	adventurer	plays	the	absurd.		But	equally	well,	if	he	wishes,	the	chaste	man,	the	civil	servant,	or	the	president	of	the	Republic.”68		Each	remakes	him/herself	involving	neither	the	absolute	negation	of	suicide	nor	the	surrender	to	 the	 illusion	 that	appeals	 to	eternal	values.	 	Above	all	one	must	choose	 to	be	lucid,	 whichever	 game	 one	 chooses	 to	 make	 life	 possible	 and	 meaningful	 for	oneself.	 	There	is,	 for	Camus,	no	formal	ethics	of	 judgment,	of	good	and	bad,	no	“right	side”	or	“wrong	side”	(l’enverse	et	l’endroit).		There	is	only	the	logic	of	the	absurd	that	modern	conquerers	know:	“They	are	not	striving	to	be	better;	 they	are	attempting	to	be	consistent.		If	the	term	‘wise	man’	can	be	applied	to	the	man	who	lives	on	what	he	has	without	speculating	on	what	he	has	not,	then	they	are	wise	men.”69		Hence,	one	hesitates	to	speak	of	ethics,	of	morality,	in	the	classical	or	modern	 sense.	 	One	does	not	 speak	of	 virtue	or	duty,	 except	 as	whim.	 	One	does	 not	 speak	 of	 the	 True,	 the	 Good,	 and	 the	 Beautiful	 and	 thus	 assert	 a	
correspondence	 between	 one’s	 lived	 experience	 and	 postulated	 transcendent	realities.	 	One	has	only	one’s	absurd	 logic,	one’s	adventure,	being	consistent	 in	the	 game	 one	 chooses	 to	 play,	 including	 the	 game	 one	 plays	 with	 oneself	 to	remake	oneself	and	to	“be”	what	one	will,	but	“as	if,”	“comme	si.”		One	can	ask	no	more	of	the	man	or	woman	who	has	found	his	or	her	lucidity,	thereby	conscious	of	the	human	condition.																																																									64	Camus	says	that	although	he	shall	have	seen	an	actor	a	hundred	times	he	shall	not	for	that	have	known	the	man.	 	 If	all	of	us	present	ourselves	 in	 images,	 then	there	 is	never	any	certainty	 that	one	has	a	basis	for	judging	any	person	as	if	one	knows	(certainly)	with	an	indisputable	truth	or	even	a	truth	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.	65	Ibid.,	81-82.	66	Ibid.,	88.	67	Ibid.,	90.	68	Ibid.,	90.	69	Ibid.,	91,	italics	added.	
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	 The	 ethics	 of	 conquest	 in	 Camus’s	 sense	 thus	 alters	what	 it	 is	 “to	 be”	 a	Don	 Juan	or	 an	Adrienne:	One	must	be	 conqueror	 “in	 the	 realm	of	 the	mind,	 a	Don	Juan	but	of	knowledge,	an	actor	but	of	the	intelligence...”70	One	must	be	even	more	than	conqueror	of	the	mind.		This	Camus	identifies	with	s/he	who	creates	beyond	 the	 absurd	present	 as	 a	matter	 of	 “metaphysical	 honor,”	 despite	 being	lucid	about	the	fact	that	s/he	is	defeated	in	advance	by	the	inevitable	enemy	that	is	death.		From	Ethics	to	Aesthetics	
		 If	 Camus	 acknowledges	 a	 rank	 of	 virtues	 the	 highest	 is	 that	 of	metaphysical	 honor,	 revolt	 the	 means	 to	 its	 accomplishment.	 The	 rebel’s	directive	 in	 action,	 however,	 is	 aesthetic—not	moral	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 but	nonetheless	finding	morality	in	the	aesthetic.		The	problem	of	life	is	aesthetic,	as	he	says:	“The	problem	for	the	absurd	artist	 is	to	acquire	this	savoir-vivre	which	transcends	 savoir-faire.”71		With	 this	 comportment	 the	 absurd	 artist	 renounces	whatever	 “prestige”	 thought	 has	 commanded	 hitherto.	 S/he	 is	 resigned	 to	 the	fact	that	“the	 intelligence…works	up	appearances	and	covers	with	 images	what	has	 no	 reason.”	 	 Asserting	 savoir-vivre	 one	 lives	 without	 apodictic	 reason	 as	ground	 of	 one’s	 choice	 of	 action,	 hence	 living	 comme	 si.	 	 Camus	 realizes	 the	appropriation	 of	 savoir-vivre	 must	 be	 viewed	 relative	 to	 “fictional	 creation,”	which	he	 characterizes	 as	 “a	work	 in	which	 the	 temptation	 to	 explain	 remains	greatest,	 in	 which	 illusion	 offers	 itself	 automatically,	 in	 which	 conclusion	 is	almost	inevitable.”72		 Art,	 as	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 novel,	 Camus	 asserts,	 “has	 its	 logic,	 its	reasonings,	 its	 intuition,	 and	 its	 postulates,”	 its	 “intellectualization.”	 	 In	 this	context	 Camus	 expresses	 his	 principal	 concern:	 “I	 want	 to	 know	 whether,	accepting	 a	 life	without	appeal,	 one	 can	 also	 agree	 to	work	 and	 create	without	
appeal	 and	what	 is	 the	way	 leading	 to	 these	 liberties.”73		This	 situates	Camus’s	imperatives	of	the	absurd	he	confronts:	“If	the	commandments	of	the	absurd	are	not	respected,	if	the	work	does	not	illustrate	divorce	and	revolt,	if	it	sacrifices	to	illusions	and	arouses	hope,	it	ceases	to	be	gratuitous.”74		If	the	work	of	art	is	no	longer	gratuitous,	then,	Camus	decries	the	consequence:	“I	can	no	longer	detach	myself	from	it.		My	life	may	find	a	meaning	in	it,	but	that	is	trifling.		It	ceases	to	be	that	exercise	in	detachment	and	passion	which	crowns	the	splendor	and	futility	of	a	man’s	life.”75	This	tendency	to	attachment	is,	for	Camus,	entirely	problematic	if	 the	 commandment	 of	 the	 absurd	 is	 rebellion,	 for	 it	 leads	 to	 resentment	 and	consequentially	permits	both	suicide	and	murder.		Hence,	Camus	asks:	“In	the	fictional	world	in	which	awareness	of	the	real	world	 is	 keenest,	 can	 I	 remain	 faithful	 to	 the	 absurd	without	 sacrificing	 to	 the																																																									70	Ibid.,	91.	71	Ibid.,	98.	72	Ibid.,	99.	73	Ibid.,	102.	74	Ibid.,	102.	75	Ibid.,	102.	
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desire	to	judge?”76		Camus	would	have	us	be	careful	of	the	“final	illusion”	that	we	are	capable	of	judging	the	True,	the	Good,	and	the	Beautiful	through	such	works	of	art.	 	The	prospect	of	 final	 illusion	has	 its	source	 in	 “stubborn	hope.”	 	Rather	than	commit	himself	 to	moral	“judgment”	or	theoretical	“justification”—thus	to	avoid	 appeal	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 apodictic	 reason—Camus	 engages	 such	works	not	morally	but	aesthetically,	 all	by	way	of	 “illustration.”	 	He	 is	quick	 to	assert	this	does	not	lead	to	absolute	negation.	 	Adhering	to	the	commandments	of	the	absurd,	Camus	commits	himself	to	denying	the	moral	validity	of	both	suicide	(as	articulated	 in	 The	Myth	 of	 Sisyphus)	 and	murder	 (as	 articulated	 in	 The	Rebel).		Despite	the	absurdity	of	human	existence,	relative	truths	such	as	we	experience	suffice	 to	prohibit	both	 suicide	and	murder—in	 the	 former	 case,	 in	 “the	age	of	negation,”	 so	 as	 to	 affirm	 human	 liberty;	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 in	 “the	 age	 of	ideologies,”	to	affirm	human	solidarity	against	tyranny	and	servitude,	against	any	master-slave	morality,	and	even	against	nationalism.77		Camus	rejects	the	appeal	to	absolute	freedom,	which	“is	achieved	by	the	suppression	of	all	contradiction:	therefore	 it	 destroys	 freedom.” 78 		 There	 can	 be	 no	 dialectic	 without	contradiction,	whether	in	the	assertion	that	becomes	an	elenchus	or	that	delivers	a	provisional	truth.			For	Camus	there	is	no	novelist	more	apropós	to	his	point	about	stubborn	hope	 than	 Dostoevsky,	 whose	 works	 of	 art	 represent	 heroes	 of	 “modern	sensibility,”	 who	 “question	 themselves	 as	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 life.” 79 		 	 In	Dostoevsky’s	art	Camus	finds	the	problem	of	logical	suicide	engaged,	therein	the	existential	problem	of	the	ground	of	modernity’s	ethics.	If	indeed	man	has	killed	“God”	 (humanity’s	 “metaphysical	 crime”),	 then	 Camus	 asks	 (with	 reference	 to	Kirilov	in	Dostoevsky’s	The	Possessed):	“But	if	this	metaphysical	crime	is	enough	for	man’s	 fulfillment,	why	 add	 suicide?	 	Why	 kill	 oneself	 and	 leave	 this	world	after	having	won	freedom?		That	is	contradictory.”80		There,	squarely,	is	Camus’s	problem	of	philosophical	 suicide,	his	 facing	squarely	the	 logic	of	suicide.	 	 In	the	transition	 from	 the	 classical	 to	 the	modern	 sensibility,	 Camus	understands	 the	problematic	 comportment:	 “As	 in	 the	 time	of	Prometheus,	 they	entertain	blind	hopes.”81		The	modern	 sensibility,	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	 lucid	of	 absurdity,	must	dismiss	such	illusion.		It	must	dismiss	the	final	illusion	that	may	be	promised	in	works	of	art,	 such	 as	 the	 novel.	 	 It	 is	 precisely	 there	 that	 one	 can	 discern	 the	 essential	commandment	 of	 the	 absurd,	 such	 as	 Camus	 clarifies	 with	 the	 foregoing	question:	Why	kill	oneself	and	leave	this	world	after	having	won	freedom?	
		One	 cannot	 answer	 this	 question	 without	 admitting	 to	 the	 absence	 of	“justification”	such	as	a	universal	rationality	prefers.	One	dismisses	the	right	of	“judgment,”	there	being	no	ground	for	practical	rationality.		From	the	outset	and	in	 the	end	of	his	philosophical	elucidation,	Camus	champions	 relative	 freedom,																																																									76	Ibid.,	102.	77	Camus,	 Lyrical	 and	 Critical	 Essays,	 190.	 	 Camus	 opines:	 “Nationalisms	 always	 make	 their	appearance	in	history	as	signs	of	decadence.”	78	Camus,	The	Rebel,	288.	79	Camus,	 The	Myth	 of	 Sisyphus,	 104.	 	 Camus	 clarifies:	 “What	 distinguishes	 modern	 sensibility	from	 classical	 sensibility	 is	 that	 the	 latter	 thrives	 on	 moral	 problems	 and	 the	 former	 on	metaphysical	problems.”	80	Ibid.,	108.	81	Ibid.,	108.	
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relative	justice,	and	relative	truth,	all	on	the	basis	of	ordinary	experience	that	is,	in	his	purview,	tragic.		Hence,	he	asserts,	“Instead	of	saying,	with	Hegel	and	Marx,	that	 all	 is	 necessary,	 [rebellion]	 only	 repeats	 that	 all	 is	 possible	 and	 that…it	 is	worth	 making	 the	 supreme	 sacrifice	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 possible.”82		 Camus’s	above	 question	 has	 force,	 challenging	 Kirilov’s	 attitude	 of	 dismay	 and	disappointment	when	he	says,	“I	am	unhappy	because	I	am	obliged	to	assert	my	freedom.”83 		 Unhappily	 obliged	 to	 assert	 his	 freedom?	 	 Indeed.	 	 Yet,	 even	Nietzsche—“the	 most	 famous	 of	 God’s	 assassins”—did	 not	 wince	 before	 that	task.	 	 He	 did	 not	 commit	 to	 the	 act	 of	 suicide	 though	 he	 felt	 obliged	 to	 give	himself	a	new	tablet	of	commandments	that	would	 inaugurate	a	transvaluation	of	past	values.		Suicide	is	not	the	answer	that	savoir-vivre	calls	into	the	forefront	of	the	present	moment	of	lucidity.	 	One	must	remake	both	the	individual	“man”	and	the	“world”—without	asking	the	question	(that	 is	“the	essential	 impulse	of	the	 absurd	mind”	when	 faced	with	 its	 survey	 of	 a	 given	 act	 (such	 as	 an	 act	 of	suicide)	 or	 a	 mind	 that	 succumbs	 to	 madness),	 viz.,	 “What	 does	 that	 prove?”		Camus	does	not	consent	to	Dostoevsky’s	stance	in	The	Brothers	Karamazov,	 i.e.,	to	assert	in	the	end	that	“existence	is	illusory	and	it	is	eternal.”84	
		In	the	end,	Camus	offers	his	alternative	to	the	creative	act	undertaken	by	one	 such	 as	 Dostoevsky.	 	 Camus’s	 confession	 is	 not	 that	 of	 the	 philosophical	artist	 such	 as	 Dostoevsky	 is	 philosophical	 in	 his	 creative	 work.	 Camus	 is	 the	absurd	artist:	 	“If	something	brings	creation	to	an	end,”	he	argues,	“it	 is	not	the	victorious	and	illusory	cry	of	the	blinded	artist:	 ‘I	have	said	everything,’	but	the	death	of	 the	 creator	which	closes	his	experience	and	 the	book	of	his	genius.”85		Can	one,	as	artist,	“prove”	oneself	victorious,	in	the	end	of	the	work	of	art?		In	the	shift	from	the	classical	metaphysical	sensibility	to	the	modern	moral	sensibility,	then	from	the	latter	to	an	aesthetic	sensibility,	Camus	insists	on	strict	adherence	to	the	commandments	of	the	absurd:		An	absurd	artist	shall	not,	in	the	end	of	his	or	her	work	of	 art,	be	blinded	 to	 the	absurd	and	shall	not	 utter	an	 illusory	 cry	that	seeks	to	sustain	the	bitter	hopes	of	the	human	heart.		In	the	shift	from	the	modern	moral	sensibility	to	the	aesthetic,	the	absurd	artist’s	metaphysical	honor	insists	on	seeing	clearly,	on	persisting	in	the	lucidity	that	 permits	 no	 appeal	 to	 the	 eternal	 or	 to	 an	 absolute	 rationality	 that	 may	govern	 the	 human	 condition.	 	 Most	 important,	 in	 being	 confronted	 with	 the	question,	‘Why	kill	oneself	and	leave	this	world	after	having	won	freedom?’,	the	absurd	artist	shall	not	answer	that	s/he	has	the	incontrovertible	answer	to	that	question.	 	 Instead,	s/he	will	 insist	that	one	ought	not	kill	oneself	and	leave	this	world	after	having	won	one’s	liberty,	admitting	to	one’s	relative	freedom.		Camus	utters	his	yet	salient	warning	in	his	insistence	on	the	limit	of	freedom,	on	the	law	of	moderation:	“Either	this	value	of	limitation	will	be	realized,	or	contemporary	excesses	will	 only	 find	 their	 principle	 and	peace	 in	 universal	 destruction.”86		 A	sense	 of	 the	 tragic	 in	 human	 existence	 requires	 this	 sense	 of	 limit.	 	 After	 all,	Camus	 asserts,	 there	 are	 those	 among	 men	 who	 arrive	 at	 “the	 limits	 of	 their																																																									82	Camus,	The	Rebel,	290.	83	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	108.	84	Ibid.,	112.	85	Ibid.,	114.	86	Camus,	The	Rebel,	295.	
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selves,	 stumbling	 over	 an	 absurdity	 they	 cannot	 overcome,”	 and	 this	 the	consequence	of	“an	excess	of	liberty.”87		Hence,	if	one	will	undertake	the	challenge	of	remaking	humanity	and	the	world,	beginning	with	remaking	oneself	as	absurd	artist,	one	must	do	so	“as	if,”	“comme	 si,”	 thereby	 not	 presuming	 to	 “demonstrate	 the	 truth	 you	 feel	 sure	 of	possessing”	 (as	 happens	 in	 “thesis-novels”).	 	 The	 absurd	 novelist	 does	 what	Camus	understands	himself	to	do	in	his	own	literary	work—to	prove	nothing,	but	“to	 raise	 up	 images,”	 his	 works	 of	 art	 “like	 the	 obvious	 symbols	 of	 a	 limited,	mortal,	and	rebellious	thought.”88		After	all,	Camus	remarked	once,	“Comfortable	optimism	surely	seems	like	a	bad	joke	in	today’s	world.”89		One	who,	like	Camus,	is	lucid,	asserts:	“All	that	remains	is	a	fate	whose	outcome	alone	is	fatal.		Outside	of	 that	single	 fatality	of	death,	everything,	 joy	or	happiness,	 is	 liberty.	 	A	world	remains	of	which	man	 is	 the	sole	master.	 	What	bound	him	was	 the	 illusion	of	another	 world.”90		 That	 is	 a	 lesson	 learned	 from	 Nietzsche	 and	 from	 his	 life	experience.	 Admitting	 to	 one’s	 mortality,	 living	 without	 the	 illusory	 appeal	 to	eternity,	one	appropriates	one’s	liberty	to	insist	on	one’s	dignity.	 	No	“proofs”	are	available	 to	us	 to	establish	any	apodictic,	 formal,	moral	 truth.	 	We	have	only	a	
savoir-vivre,	thus	a	will	to	live	creatively,	“as	if…comme	si.”		That	style	of	life	may	turn	out	to	be	both	efficacious	and	exemplary.		As	Camus	says	in	interview,	“An	analysis	of	the	idea	of	revolt	could	help	us	to	discover	ideas	capable	of	restoring	a	 relative	 meaning	 to	 existence,	 although	 a	 meaning	 that	 would	 always	 be	 in	danger.”91		 Camus’s	 literary	work,	 as	 the	work	of	 an	 absurd	 artist	 in	 the	 act	 of	rebellion	 and	 resistance	 to	 the	 totalitarian	 impulses	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	contributes	to	that	aim.		What	 matters	 in	 creative	 rebellion,	 Camus	 declared,	 is	 “to	 create	 in	history	what	Shakespeare,	Cervantes,	Moliere,	and	Tolstoy	knew	how	to	create:	a	world	always	 ready	 to	 satisfy	 the	hunger	 for	 freedom	and	dignity	which	every	man	 carries	 in	 his	 heart.”92		 Such	 acts	 of	 creation	 are	 at	 the	 center	 of	 Camus’s	
ethos:	 	Is	 it	 possible	 eternally	 to	 reject	 injustice	without	 ceasing	 to	 acclaim	 the	nature	of	man	and	the	beauty	of	the	world?		Our	answer	is	yes.		This	ethic	at	once	unsubmissive	and	loyal,	is	in	any	event	the	only	one	that	lights	the	way	to	a	 truly	realistic	revolution.	 	 In	upholding	beauty,	we	prepare	 the	way	for	the	day	of	regenerating	when	civilization	will	give	first	place—far	ahead	 of	 the	 formal	 principles	 and	 degraded	 values	 of	 history—to	 this	living	 virtue	 on	 which	 is	 founded	 the	 common	 dignity	 of	 man	 and	 the	world	he	lives	in…93																																																									87	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	204.	88	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	116.	89	Camus,	 Lyrical	 and	 Critical	 Essays,	 351.	 	 The	 statement	 is	 given	 in	 interview	 with	 Gabriel	d’Aubarede	in	Les	Nouvelles	Littéraires,	10	May	1951.	90	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	117.	91	Camus,	 Lyrical	 and	 Critical	 Essays,	 346.	 	 The	 statement	 is	 given	 in	 interview	 with	 Jeanine	Delpech,	in	Les	Nouvelles	littératres,	15	November	1945.	92	Camus,	The	Rebel,	276.	93	Ibid.,	276-277.	
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	One	asserts	 thereby	 the	dignity	of	all	humanity	 in	 its	 solidarity,	hence	Camus’s	imperative	 to	 one	 and	 all	 to	 commit	 neither	 suicide	nor	murder.94		 In	 the	 end,	Camus	would,	 if	 he	could,	 because	he	 should,	 die	his	mortal	death.	 	But,	 in	 that	moment	that	discloses	his	finitude,	he	would	do	so	uttering	in	song	the	words	of	Epicurus:	“Ah,	with	what	dignity	we	have	lived.”95		 			
																																																								94	There	remains	the	question,	if	not	a	complaint,	that	Camus	would,	if	he	must,	when	spirit	and	intelligence	are	in	accord,	permit	killing	in	defense	of	justice.		Such	was	his	position	expressed	in	his	 letters	 to	 a	 German	 friend	 in	 1943	 and	 1944.	 	 See	 here,	 Albert	 Camus,	 Lettres	 à	 un	 ami	
allemande,	 ed.	 Jean-Marie	 Tremblay	 (Paris:	 Les	 Editions	 Gallimard,	 1st	 Edition,	 1948;	 Revised	edition	1972;	Electronic	edition,	2008).	95	Camus,	The	Rebel,	30.	
